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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the DeStefano family, I’d like to welcome you here
tonight. Unfortunately, they could not be with us, but they send their
regrets and their best wishes.
For those of you who have never met Al DeStefano, let me briefly
describe him to you. He started at Fordham Law School as an evening
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review,
and graduated at the top of his class. He then went on to become a
partner in the Becker firm, specializing in corporate matters, particularly
mergers and acquisitions. In his spare time, he devoted himself to
numerous charitable endeavors and, as an adjunct professor on our
faculty, shared his enormous knowledge and experience with our
students.
In short, Al DeStefano was a symbol of what Fordham Law School
was in the past, he is a symbol of what Fordham Law School still is, and
he will remain a symbol of what Fordham Law School will be in the
future.
Since its inception about a decade ago, the DeStefano Lectures
have covered a wide range of timely and diverse topics, such as: the
need for market regulation, the demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur
Andersen, strengthening the protection for investors, making our capital
markets more transparent, the subprime mortgage meltdown, and last
year, Corporate Accountability and Governance.
Tonight we are in for another treat.
Our Constitution was founded on the premise of the separation of
powers – legislative, executive and judiciary. The only way that works
is with an independent judiciary, and a shining example of such
independence is our speaker here tonight who will discuss “Are Federal
Judges Competent? – Dilettantes in an Age of Economic Expertise.”
Jed Rakoff was born in the City of Brotherly Love, the birthplace
of the Declaration of Independence.
He earned his BA in English literature from Swarthmore College
with honors, received a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford, and
graduated Cum Laude from Harvard Law School – a school at which his
younger brother Todd is a faculty member.
After law school, he clerked for the Honorable Abraham Freedman
of the Third Circuit, spent two years practicing law at Debevoise, and
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moved on to become an assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York where he spent seven years, the last two of which he was
Chief of the Business & Securities Fraud Prevention Unit. After that he
became a partner at Mudge Rose, and then Fried Frank, where he
headed both firms’ criminal defense and RICO sections.
While learning and honing his legal skills, he nurtured a second
career – that of a songwriter. Indeed, the Huffington Post recently – in a
feature article – suggested Jed Rakoff should become a member of the
Supremes.
Because of his dual interest in the law and songwriting, this caused
a lot of confusion, because as you know the Supremes were a most
successful female trio singing group with twelve number one records on
Billboard’s Hot 100 list. Rumor had it he sought to join the trio as its
first male vocalist, but negotiations fell through when he refused to
shave his beard.
After careful analysis, however, it appears that the Huffington Post
article intended instead to suggest that he should be appointed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
His judicial career began in 1995 when President Clinton appointed
him to the Southern District of New York to replace David Edelstein, a
Fordham graduate of the Class of 1932.
Despite an extraordinarily busy judicial career, he has managed to
be a lecturer for two decades at a law school some 100 blocks to the
North.
A listing of the significant cases he presided over would take all
night.
Some of his more notable cases, however, include SEC v.
WorldCom, which became a model on the issue of corporate governance
reform.
More recently, he initially rejected as inadequate a settlement of
$33 million between the SEC and Bank of America in an action
involving the non-disclosure – before the merger – of an agreement to
pay billions of dollars in bonuses to Merrill employees. After much
discussion and further negotiation, the judge ultimately approved a
settlement of approximately $150 million, almost five times the size of
the originally proposed settlement.
Judge, as a stockholder of Bank of America, I do not thank you for
your persistence; however, I must reluctantly agree with you – in the
privacy of this room – that you did “the right thing.”
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As far as agreeing or disagreeing with judges’ opinions, Judge
Mulligan, my mentor, once wrote that exactly one half of the attorneys
that appeared before him agreed with his decisions.
That benchmark holds true for any judge, and Judge Rakoff is no
exception.
However, he has one distinction, in that one of his decisions has
been universally acclaimed – without a single dissent.
That decision – some thirty-five years ago – was when he decided
to propose to Ann Rosenberg a/k/a Ann Rakoff, a/k/a the Director of our
Corporate Law Program.
Ann Rakoff works tirelessly and effectively to ensure the success of
our Corporate Center; and, for that, we are most grateful.
Bottom line, Judge Rakoff really doesn’t need an introduction. His
record of outstanding achievements and performance speaks for itself –
as an academic, as a jurist and as a practitioner.
I cannot comment on his achievements as a songwriter.
Therefore, without further ado, it is my distinct honor and pleasure
to turn the proceedings over to the Honorable Jed Rakoff.
LECTURE: ARE FEDERAL JUDGES COMPETENT? DILETTANTES IN AN
AGE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE
JUDGE RAKOFF: The title of my little talk here tonight is “Are
Federal Judges Competent?” This naturally raises the question of
whether I am competent to answer that question. I put this question to
myself, and, after careful consideration of both sides of the argument,
concluded that I am competent to determine whether I am competent. As
H. L. Mencken once said, “A judge is a law student who grades his own
exams.”
But the sub-title of my talk – “Dilettantes in an Age of Economic
Expertise” – is more revealing of what this talk is about, which is
whether generalist judges and courts of general jurisdiction still make
sense in an era of ever greater economic specialization. With the advent
of the administrative state in the twentieth century, much of the power
of both legislatures and courts was ceded to administrative agencies – in
the supposed interest of enhanced expertise. But for the most part it was
courts of general jurisdiction, and no special expertise, that were the
ultimate arbiters of whether the administrative agency had acted fairly
and in accordance with its legislative mandate. Over the past some
decades, however, there has been an accelerating trend toward creating
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specialized courts, that is, courts that specialize in specific subject
matters. Although these courts vary widely, they are premised on the
common assumption that limiting the subject matter of a court to a
particular kind of controversy will bring an increased expertise to the
resolution of such controversies.
In New York State, for example, you have the surrogate courts
(dealing with probate matters), the housing courts, the family courts, the
drug courts, and so forth. Although the trend is less pronounced at the
federal level, even there you have the bankruptcy courts, the tax court,
the court of international trade, and, of particular interest, two appellate
courts that have a semi-specialized jurisdiction: the D.C. Circuit, which
has exclusive jurisdiction over many, though not all, administrative
appeals, and the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals. In a more diffuse sense, you also have the growth within
administrative agencies of administrative law courts that are called upon
to adjudicate certain controversies in their specialized areas.
Very recently, there has also been a trend in many states to create
specialized courts to deal with corporate and business disputes. Part of
the impetus for this development comes from the success of the
Delaware Chancery Court, which, somewhat ironically, did not begin as
a specialized court but has in some sense come to be viewed as one
because it deals with so many corporate law issues in a state where most
large U.S. corporations are incorporated. (Incidentally, Delaware’s
hegemony in this regard is now being challenged by such diverse places
as Nevada and the Cayman Islands; but over sixty percent of Fortune
500 companies are still incorporated in Delaware.)
In any event, it is widely perceived that part of Delaware’s
attractiveness to business is not just its pro-business corporate laws
themselves, but also the expertise of its courts in interpreting those laws,
and the result has been that no fewer than nineteen other states have
created specialized business courts. In New York State, for example,
this takes the form of the Commercial Part of the New York State
Supreme Court, where complex commercial cases are sent for expedited
treatment.
While it may be too soon to judge these new business courts, so far
they seem to have been well received. But partly this is because the
judges who have been assigned to them are often the most experienced
and best regarded judges from the courts of general jurisdiction; so it is
difficult to tell whether the success is the result of specialization or of
simply staffing these courts with the best generalist judges. Still, it has
been suggested that even these very good generalist judges, when called
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upon to limit their focus to sophisticated business cases, develop an
enhanced expertise that makes them better able to understand the
financial, economic, and commercial complexities of these cases, and
thus better able to render more informed and fairer decisions. If so, the
argument goes, would it not make sense to develop a specialized
business court at the federal level as well, staffed, perhaps, by judges
who by education or experience have particular expertise in complex
business, financial, commercial, and economic issues?
The question is a fair one. At present, the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts is so broad that no judge readily develops more than a
passing expertise in more than a few areas. On any given day, a typical
federal judge might have to give some attention to, say, a narcotics case,
a securities fraud action, a maritime dispute, a labor controversy, an
employment discrimination claim, and a trademark case. By background
or experience, the judge may have some special familiarity with a few of
these areas; but there may be others that he or she will know little or
nothing about. In particular, even if the judge knows the law in each of
these areas, the judge may have little specialized knowledge of the
factual context in which the law must be applied. So, for example, even
a judge who is familiar with patent law in general will frequently be
confronted with patent cases that involve obscure technologies that the
judge must learn from scratch. Or, again, a judge who generally knows
the antitrust laws will often be confronted with antitrust cases involving
specialized practices in specialized markets about which he knows next
to nothing.
And just who are these federal district judges who are being called
upon to judge these complicated disputes (assuming the disputes aren’t
to be decided by an even less expert jury)? Well, for the most part, we
are History or English Literature majors, who spent twenty years or
more after law school practicing in some narrow specialty and who got
on the court, we like to think, because we were reasonably intelligent
and reasonably respected in our profession – although maybe it helped
that we knew someone who knew a U.S. Senator. It also might have
helped that we had never said or written anything controversial – which
was itself a function of our lack of expertise.
Of course, we all came to the court with one area of expertise, in
that we had all been experienced litigators. Notice I use the word
“litigator,” rather than the words “trial lawyer,” because in an age of
fewer and fewer trials, some lawyers are now being appointed to the
federal district court with little trial experience. But to be a successful
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litigator, even outside the trial context, one must be a “quick study” –
because you cannot hope to best your opponent unless you know more
than he does about the underlying facts of a case, no matter how
complicated. So, as every successful litigator will tell you, you do, for a
short time, become incredibly expert in some arcane area – though you
may forget it all the day after the case is over.
In theory, one might argue, the former litigator turned federal judge
might be able to use this ability to quickly master vast quantities of
arcane materials to become an instant expert in any matter brought
before her. But this assumes you have nothing else to do, that, like the
litigator you once were, you can devote the great bulk of your energies
to a single case, at least for a concentrated period of time. But that is not
the fate of a federal district judge. If, in actuality, you have a docket of
300 active cases, at least 100 of which are moderately complex and all
of which have some call on your attention, how will you ever find the
time to become an expert, even in the ad hoc way of litigators? Hence,
the argument goes, one must have specialized courts, where judges, who
may often be appointed to such a court because of their specialized
training, will in any event be confronted with a sufficiently narrow range
of subject matters that they can develop the expertise necessary to really
understand such cases.
Such arguments, as I say, are not without force. But there are, I
would like now to suggest, at least five fundamental reasons why the
creation of a federal business court, or, indeed, the creation of any more
specialized federal courts than we already have, would be a major
mistake.
First, judicial specialization tends to obscure what judges are really
supposed to do, which is to apply reason, legal principles, and basic
moral values to the resolution of controversies. As the great Harvard
Law expert on administrative law, Louis Jaffe, stated in explaining why
administrative review should ultimately be vested in courts of general
jurisdiction: “the constitutional courts of this country are the
acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integrity of the legal
system.”1

1

LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 589-90 (1965). He
added: “I use integrity here in its specific sense of unity and coherence and in its more
general sense of the effectuation of the values upon which this unity and coherence are
built.” Id.
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This is true even in those instances where judges are appointed or
elected to generalist courts on the assumption that they will promote a
particular policy or agenda; for in courts of general jurisdiction the great
majority of cases to come before such judges will be cases as to which
such a policy or agenda is irrelevant, and resort must then be had to
what is commonly called “good judgment.” It is by this, and not by any
narrow expertise, that judges are ultimately judged to be good or bad
judges.
It is also why judges are required to state the reasons for their
decisions, so that they can be reviewed on appeal, as well as assessed by
the legal community and the general public. But in specialized courts,
judges, rather than having to clearly state the reasons for their
conclusions, can wrap their decisions in the cloak of expertise, to which
appellate courts inevitably give deference. Specialized courts, I submit,
quickly develop an impenetrable jargon that makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to understand how they reached their decisions. And
precisely because of this obscurity, the appellate court, rather than
admitting its mystification, defers to the lower court’s supposed
expertise. As a former member of my court, the famous judge and
lawyer Simon Rifkind, stated to Congress in opposing the creation of
specialized federal courts:
[W]hen you are dealing with a matter that concerns the general
welfare of the United States, it is not wise to create a small group of
men who become, like the Egyptian priests, the sole custodians of a
body of knowledge and who sooner or later begin to talk a language
that nobody else understands but which is common only to them and
the practitioners who appear before them and who drift away from
those general principles of equity [and] morality, which pervade the
entire judicial system.2

Second, because specialized courts deal with disputes specific to a
particular constituency, they tend to be influenced, or even captured, by
the interests and biases common to that constituency. Thus, as I will
discuss further below, the Federal Circuit, in dealing chiefly with
disputes between patent owners and patent challengers, only hears
arguments that reflect the shared assumptions and prejudices of patent

2

General Revision of the Patents Laws: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. No. 3 of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 175 (1967) (statement of J. Simon Rifkind).
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owners and patent challengers, and eventually comes to share some of
those assumptions and prejudices.
Furthermore, where a court deals chiefly or exclusively with
controversies involving a limited group of special interests, those special
interests are much more likely to play an active role in the selection of
the judges to that court. Thus, in the case of New York’s housing court,
landlord and tenant lobbyists are widely believed to play a dominant
role, fueled by campaign contributions, in the selection of judges who
are known from the outset to be pro-landlord or pro-tenant.
And even where the selection process is more neutral, a specialized
court is much more likely than a generalist court to be affected by the
judges’ personal ideologies, since, unlike a generalist court, the judges
on a specialist court are dealing again and again with the same small set
of issues. The fact that those issues may appear complicated, or require a
certain amount of expertise to fully grasp, cannot disguise the fact that
they usually involve competing values that no amount of expertise can
resolve. As Circuit Judge Richard Posner, who certainly possesses a
wealth of economics expertise, has written in opposition to a specialized
antitrust court:
Antitrust is a forbidding field to the noninitiate. Its practitioners are
experts, but are they objective? Antitrust theorists are divided into
three warring camps. One camp thinks the most important values
that the antitrust laws are designed and should be interpreted to
promote are social or political values having to do with
decentralizing economic power and equalizing the distribution of
wealth. . . . [T]he two other camps . . . are united in believing that the
only proper goals of antitrust law are economic . . . [but are divided
between] a “Harvard School,” [which is] prone to find monopolistic
practices, and a “Chicago School,” which believes the same
practices to be for the most part procompetitive . . . .
These cleavages, reflecting deeper and at the moment unbridgeable
divisions in ethical, political, and economic thought, would not be
eliminated by committing the decision of antitrust appeals to a
specialized court. They would be exacerbated. A [particular] “camp”
is more likely to gain the upper hand in a specialized court than in
the entire federal court system or even in one circuit. This is not only
because appointment to the specialized court would inevitably be
made from the camps, but also because experts are more sensitive to
the swings in professional opinion than an outsider, a generalist,
would be. The appearance of uniform policy that would result from
the domination of the specialized court by one of the contending
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factions in antitrust policy would be an illusion. It would reflect
power rather than consensus.3

Third, judges in specialized courts, typically appointed for a term of
years, have a temptation to look over their shoulders at the impact of
their decisions on their future employment outside the specialized court,
thus compromising their independence. This is notoriously a problem
for administrative law judges, who regularly seek employment at the
end of their terms with law firms that have regularly appeared before
them. As a result, it is widely believed, though perhaps unfairly, that the
decisions made by an outgoing administrative judge near the end of her
term will seemingly be affected by the interests of the kind of clients
represented by the law firms she would most like to join once her term is
over.
This problem is not totally absent even in the case of life-tenured
federal generalist judges who, because of the unfortunate state of
judicial salaries, are departing the bench with more frequency than in the
past (a problem further exacerbated by the recent tendency to appoint
relatively younger persons to the federal bench). But if, even now, this
presents a threat to judicial independence, it would be considerably
exacerbated if such persons were judges on specialized courts, where the
divisions are so much more clearly drawn and the threat to
independence resulting from the desire for lucrative future employment
might well become severe.
Fourth,—and to my mind the most insidious problem with
specialized courts—even the best of judges in specialized courts tend to
develop a tunnel vision, oblivious to developments in other parts of the
law that should impact their decisions. As we all learned long ago, “the
law is a seamless web.” The law strives to promote consistency and
predictability, not only for their practical importance, but also, in
Professor Jaffe’s words, “to affirm the capacity of our society to
integrate its purposes.”4 Relatedly, judges are repeatedly called upon to
balance competing objectives; it makes no sense for the balance reached
in the rest of the law to be disregarded, or even overruled, in some

3

Richard A. Posner, Will The Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay
On Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 781
(1983).
4
JAFFE, supra note 1, at 590.
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specialized arena, for no better reason than that the specialized judges
are intent on promoting their own narrow interests.
A good example of this problem, I reluctantly suggest, is the
Federal Circuit. As noted, the Federal Circuit, while it has partial
jurisdiction over a number of subjects, has exclusive jurisdiction over
patent disputes and in this respect is a specialized court. Given the
importance of patents in a modern economy, the experience of the
Federal Circuit may therefore be suggestive of the benefits and
detriments of any proposed federal business court.
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982, primarily in response to
complaints from the patent bar that patent law was being interpreted by
the various circuit courts in radically varying ways, leading to
inconsistency in the laws governing one of the more important areas of
our economy. The circuit split, crudely stated, was between those circuit
courts that favored giving strong protection to existing patents and
strong encouragement to new patents in order to incentivize innovation,
and those circuit courts that favored narrow interpretation and limited
protection of patents, both out of antitrust concerns and because of a
belief that too broad patent protection actually de-incentivized
innovation.
The real culprits here were the Supreme Court and Congress, either
of which could have resolved these long-time splits through judicial
decision or legislation. But, instead, they chose to duck the issue: the
Supreme Court by refusing to grant certiorari, and Congress by
pretending that this circuit split, which really reflected a clash of values,
could be better decided by a specialized court that would bring
uniformity to patent law. To that end, Congress, while leaving it to
generalist district courts to still decide patent disputes in the first
instance, created, in 1982, a single appellate court, the Federal Circuit,
to decide all patent issues on appeal.
This solved the immediate problem in that it guaranteed that the
circuit split would be resolved, at least at the circuit level, by the
creation of this specialized court. But no one should have been under
any illusion that it meant that the split would be resolved by the
application of some special expertise. The split was one of policy, and,
in operational terms, it was largely a split between the objectives
promoted by patent laws and those promoted by antitrust laws. By
creating a court that had exclusive power over the patent laws and had
nothing to do with antitrust laws—a court that heard disputes between
members of the patent bar and rarely if ever heard from the antitrust
bar—a court that was largely staffed by judges who, though almost
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uniformly excellent, were frequently drawn from a patent law
background—Congress guaranteed, wittingly or unwittingly, that the
split would be resolved in a pro-patent fashion. And, indeed, over the
next fifteen years or so, the Federal Circuit created a protection for
existing patents and receptiveness to new patents that went well beyond
anything previously seen.
Almost from the outset, the district courts saw this as one-sided and
unbalanced. But the Federal Circuit began overruling the district courts
to a virtually unprecedented degree. District courts suffered a forty
percent reversal rate in the Federal Circuit, compared to a less than five
percent reversal rate in all other circuits. Was this because, as
proponents of specialized courts might argue, the district courts lacked
the specialized expertise that the Federal Circuit brought to bear? Or
was it because the Federal Circuit, oblivious to the kind of balancing of
values that is the everyday concern of generalist courts, was off on a
frolic of its own?
The answer was supplied by the United States Supreme Court.
Beginning in 1996 and continuing through 2010, the Supreme Court
began reversing the Federal Circuit at a rate unmatched by any other
circuit court, even the much maligned Ninth Circuit. Moreover, eight of
these reversals were unanimous and none was by a bare 5-4 vote. Many
were couched in harsh language, and nearly all suggested, at least by
clear implication, that the Supreme Court believed that the Federal
Circuit was using the cover of “expertise” to interpret the law differently
from how it had been uniformly interpreted in other contexts. So much
for the supposed benefits of specialization.
A comparison with another so-called specialized court, the
Delaware Court of Chancery, is also instructive. Although Delaware law
as a whole reflects a pro-corporate tilt, many observers, including this
one, find the decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the
Delaware courts generally, very well-written and remarkably free of
jargon or cant. But although proponents of specialized business courts
frequently point to this high quality as evidence of what a specialized
business court can achieve, in fact I think it is substantially wrong to
view the Delaware Chancery Court as a specialized court, at least in the
sense of a court of limited subject matter jurisdiction. In actuality, the
jurisdiction of the Delaware Chancery Court is very broad, comprising
the extensive equity jurisdiction that marked the reach of the English
High Court of Chancery back in the days when the courts of England
were divided between the courts of law and the courts of equity. If, then,
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the Delaware Court of Chancery speaks with the clarity and vision of a
generalist court, it is because it really is, fundamentally, a generalist
court. Because, however, its jurisdiction includes so much of Delaware
corporate law, and because so many large corporations are incorporated
in Delaware, its decisions have a huge impact on the development of
corporate law everywhere.
In much the same way, because Wall Street is located in the
Southern District of New York, more cases involving high finance are
brought in my district than in any other federal district and so our
decisions frequently have impact in this area; but this does not mean that
we are a specialized court, or that our decisions require the exercise of
some supposed expertise unobtainable by district judges in other
districts, or that we do not pay a lot of attention to what other districts,
and circuits, say about these issues. Like all generalist courts, and unlike
truly specialized courts, we are the beneficiaries of cross-fertilization.
And you don’t need Darwin or Mendel to tell you that cross-fertilization
is a good thing.
Fifth, and finally, I would go so far as to suggest that a judge’s
lack of specialized expertise is frequently a benefit, rather than a
detriment, in reaching the right decision. Because what does a good
judge do if he doesn’t understand some complexity in some abstruse
area? He requires the lawyers to explain it to him, in language he can
understand. And the result, almost always, is that he comes to appreciate
that the dispute before him cannot be resolved by the exercise of any
supposed expertise but only by the careful weighing of competing
interests and values well familiar to every judge. After many years on
the bench, this is what Justice Holmes had to say on this subject:
Having to listen to arguments, now about railroad business, now
about a patent, now about an admiralty case, now about mining law
and so on, a thousand times I have thought that I was hopelessly
stupid [but] as many times have found that when I got hold of the
language there was no such thing as a difficult case.5

I am not sure I could say it any better than that; and, even if I could,
when you have Oliver Wendell Holmes on your side, it is time to sit
down. So, let me simply conclude by giving my answer to my original
question: Are federal judges competent? Competent to appreciate every
5

Letter to John C.H. Wu (May 14, 1923), in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, HIS
BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 163-63 (Harry C. Shriver ed.,
1936); Posner, supra note 3, at 787 (quoting id.).
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nuance of every jargon-filled specialty? - perhaps not. But competent to
judge, well and with understanding, the essential disputes brought
before us in every area of our jurisdiction? - you bet!

